Justice – Jhwh

Justice

(II.). 1. The administration of justice in early Israel. — (a) The earliest form of the administration of justice was that exercised by the head of the family. He was not only the final authority to whom the members of a family appealed when questions of right and wrong had to be decided, and to whose sentence they had to submit, but he also had the power of pronouncing even the death penalty (see Genesis 38:24). On the other hand, the rights of each member of the family were jealously safeguarded by all the rest; if harm or injury of any kind were sustained by any member, all the members were bound to avenge him; in the case of death the law of blood-revenge laid upon all the duty of taking vengeance by slaying a member of the murderer’s family, preferably, but not necessarily, the murderer himself.

(6) The next stage was that in which justice was • administered by the ‘elders of a clan or tribe (see Numbers 11:16). A number of families, united by ties of kinship, became, by the formation of a clan, a unity as closely connected as the family itself. In this stage of the organization of society the procedure in deciding questions of right and wrong was doubtless much the same as that which obtains even up to the present day among the Bedouin Arabs. When a quarrel arises between two members of the tribe, the matter is brought before the acknowledged head, the sheik. He seeks to make peace between them; having heard both sides, he declares who is right and who is wrong, and settles the form of satisfaction which the latter should make; but his judgment has no binding force, no power other than that of moral suasion; influence is brought to bear by the members of the family of the one declared to be in the wrong, urging him to submit, — the earlier regime thus coming into play, in a modified way; but if he is not to be prevailed upon, the issue is decided by the sword. In Exodus 18:13–27 we have what purports to be the original institution of the administration of justice by the elders of clans, Moses himself acting in the capacity of a kind of court of appeal (.v.^); it is, of course, quite possible that, so far as Israel was concerned, this account is historically true, but the institution must have been much older than the time of Moses, and in following Jethro’s guidance, Moses was probably only re-instituting a regime which had long existed among his nomad forefathers. It is a more developed form of tribal justice that we read of in Deuteronomy 21:18–21; here the father of a rebellious son, finding his authority set at nought, appeals to the ‘elders of the city’; in the case of being found guilty the death-sentence is pronounced against the son, and the sentence is carried out by representatives of the community. The passage is an important one, for it evidently contains echoes of very early usage, the mention of the mother may imply a distant reminiscence of the matriarchate; and the tact that the head of the family exercises his power recalls the earlier rSgime already referred to, while the present institution of the administration of justice by elders is also borne witness to. See, further, Judges.

Another point of importance which must be briefly alluded to is the ‘judgment of God.’ In the case of questions arising in which the difficulty of finding a solution appeared insuperable, recourse was had to the judgment of God (see Exodus 22:8, 9) the ‘judges’ referred to here (RV has ‘God’ in the text, but ‘judges’ in the mg.) were those who were qualified to seek a decision from God. See, in this connexion, Deuteronomy 21:1–9.

(c) In the monarchical period a further development takes place; the older system, whereby justice was administered by the elders of the cities, is indeed still seen to be in vogue (cf. 1 Kings 21:8–13) ; but two other powers had now arisen, and both tended to diminish the power and moral influence of the elders of the cities, so far as their judicial functions were concerned.

(i) The king. — It is probable that at first he decided appeals only, but in course of time all important matters — so far as this was possible — were apparently brought before him (see 1 Samuel 8:20. 2 Samuel 14:4 ff. IS"-‘, 1 Kings 3:9. 2 Kings 15:5) according to 1 Kings 7:7. Solomon had a covered place constructed, which was called the’ porch of judgment,’ and which was in close proximity to his own. palace. But though the king was supreme judge in the land, it would obviously soon have become impossible for him to attend to all the more important causes even; the number of these, as well as other calls upon his time, necessitated the appointment of representatives who should administer justice in the king’s name. The appointment of these must have further curtailed the powers of the earlier representatives of justice, already referred to. One of the worst results, however, of this was that the motives of administering justice became different; in the old days, when the sheik, or the city elder, was called upon to decide an issue, he did it rather in the capacity of a friend who desired peace between two other friends than as a strictly legal official; his interest in the disputants, as being both of his own kin, or at all events both members of the same community to which he belonged, impelled him to do his utmost to make peace. It was otherwise when a stranger had to decide between two men of whom he knew nothing; he had no personal interest in them, nor would it have been his main endeavour to try to secure a lasting peace between the two, as had been the case in earlier days among the sheiks and city elders; the tie of kinship was absent. The result was that personal interest of another kind asserted itself, and, as there is abundant evidence to show, the administration of justice was guided rather by the prospect of gain than in the interests of equity. It is an ever-recurring burden in the Prophetical writings that justice is thwarted through bribery: ‘Every one loveth gifts and followeth after rewards’ (Isaiah 1; see, further, 5, Micah 3:11 T, Ezekiel 18:8 22:12 etc., and ct. the picture of the ideal judge in Isaiah 11:3, 4). A very aggravated instance of the miscarriage of justice is recorded in 1 Kings 21 ; but such cases were undoubtedly rare exceptions; so far as Israel and Judah were concerned, it was not from the central authority that the perversion of justice proceeded, but rather from the king’s representatives, the ‘princes’ (sarim), who misused their authority for nefarious ends.

(ii) The priesthood. — Even before the Exile the administration of justice was to a large extent centred in the hands of the Levitical priesthood; nothing could illustrate this more pointedly than Deuteronomy 19:15–21. where the outlines of a regular, formulated, judicial system seem to be referred to, in which the final authority is vested in the priesthood. What must have contributed to this more than anything else was the fact that from early times such matters as seemed to the elders of the city to defy a satisfactory solution were, as we have already seen. submitted to the judgment of God; the intermediaries between God and men were the priests, who carried the matter into the Divine presence, received the Divine answer, and announced that answer to those who came for judgment (see Exodus 22:8, 9. and esp. Deuteronomy 33:8 ff. ‘And of Levi he said, Thy Thummim and thy Urim are with thy godly one. . . .’). It is easy to see how, under these circumstances, the authority of the priesthood, in all matters, tended constantly to increase (see, further, Deuteronomy 17:8–13 19:15–21).

But in spite of the rise of these two new factors — the king and the priesthood — ^it must be borne in mind that the elders of the cities still continued to carry out their judicial functions.

Regarding what would correspond to the modern idea of a law court, we have no data to go upon so far as the eariiest period is concerned ; but it may be taken for granted that, among the nomads, those who had a quarrel would repair to the tent of the sheik, in which an informal court would be held. From the time of the settlement in Canaan, however, and onwards, when city life had developed, there is plenty of Information on the subject. The open space in the immediate vicinity of the city gate was the usual place for assemblies of the people, and it was here that the more formal ‘courts of law’ were held (see Amos 5:12, 15. Deuteronomy 21:19 22:15 25:7. Zee 8:16; the ‘porch of judgment’ of king Solomon [1 K 7:7). already referred to, was of course exceptional).

2. Post-exilic period. — At the time of Ezra we find that the administration of justice by the elders of the city, which had continued throughout the period of the monarchy, is still in vogue (see Ezra 7:25 10:14) they presided over the local courts in the smaller provincial towns. These smaller courts consisted of seven members; in the larger towns the corresponding courts consisted of twenty-three members. In the event of these lower courts not being able to come to a decision regarding any matter brought before them, the case was carried to the superior court at Jerusalem, the Sanhedrin (wh. see). The procedure in these courts was of the simplest character: the injured person brought his complaint before the judges, previous notice having been given, and publicly gave his version of the matter; the accused then in his turn defended himself; — judging from Job 31:35 a written statement was sometimes read out; — the testimony of two witnesses at least was required to substantiate an accusation; according to the Talmud, these witnesses had to be males and of age, but the testimony of a slave was not regarded as valid. Before witnesses gave their testimony they were adjured to speak the truth, and the whole truth. False witnesses — and these were evidently not unknown — had to suffer the same punishment as the victim of their false testimony would have had to undergo, or had undergone. If no witnesses were forthcoming, the truth of a matter had, so far as possible, to be obtained by the cross-questioning and acumen of the judges.

3. In the NT. — The administration of justice under the Roman rigime comes before us in connexion with St. Paul (Acts 24 ff.). According to Roman law, when a Roman citizen was accused of anything, the magistrate could fix any time that suited him for the trial ; however long the trial might be postponed, the accused was nevertheless imprisoned for the whole time. But there were different kinds of imprisonment recognized by Roman law, and it lay within the magistrate’s power to decide which kind the prisoner should suffer. These different grades of custody were: the pubhc gaol, where the prisoner was bound in chains (ct. Acts 12:6 21:33) in the custody of a soldier, who was responsible for the prisoner, and to whom the prisoner was chained ; and an altogether milder form, according to which the accused was in custody only so far that he was under the supervision of a magistrate, who stood surety for him; it was only those of high rank to whom this indulgence was accorded. In the case of St. Paul it was the second of these which was put in force.

As regards appeals to the Emperor (Acts 25:11, 12). the following conditions applied when one claimed this right. In the Roman provinces the supreme criminal jurisdiction was exercised by the governor of the province, whether proconsul, proprsetor, or procurator; no appeal was permitted to provincials from a governor’s judgment; but Roman citizens had the right of appealing to the tribunes, who had the power of ordering the case to be transferred to the ordinary tribunals at Rome. But from the time of Augustus the power of the tribunes was centred in the person of the Emperor; and with him alone, therefore, lay the power of hearing appeals. The form of such an appeal was the simple pronunciation of the word ‘Appello’; there was no need to make a written appeal, the mere utterance of the word in court suspended all further proceedings there.

W. O. E. Oesterley.

Justification, Justify

Verb and noun originate in Christian Latin (the Vulgate) ; Lat. analogy affords some excuse for the Romanist reading of ‘justify’ as ‘make just,’ by which sanctification ia included under justification. Neither the Heb. nor the Greek original allows of any other definition of ‘justify’ than ‘count just’; it is a term of ethical relationship, not ethical quality, and signifies the footing on which one is set towards another, not the character imparted to one. The Heb. verb (abstract noim wanting) deviates from the above sense only in the late Heb. of Daniel 12:3 (rendered in EV ‘turn . . . to righteousness’ ) . The Greek equivalent had a wide range of meaning — denoting (1) to set Tight, correct a wrong thing done: (2) to deem right, claim, approve, consent to anything; (3) to do right by any one, either in vindication or in punishment(so ‘justify’ m Scottish law = ‘execute’).

The usage of the LXX and NT, applying the word to persons, comes under (3) above, but only as taken in bonam partem; in other words, justification in Biblical speech imports the vindication or clearing from charge of the justified person, never his chastisement. Justification is essentially the act of a judge (whether in the official orthe ethical sense), effected onjust grounds and in foro (Dei, conscientim, or reipublic(E, as the case may be). It must be borne in mind that the character of Father and the office of Judge in God consist together in NT thought. We have to distinguish (1) the general use of the word as a term of moral judgment, in which there is no difference between OT and NT writers; (2) its specific Pauline use, esp. characteristic of Rom. and Galatians.

1. In common parlance, one is ‘justified’ when pronounced just on trial, when cleared of blame or aspersion. So God is ‘justified,’ where His character or doings have borne the appearance of injustice and have been, or might be, arraigned before the human conscience; see Job 8:3. Psalms 51:4 (Romans 3:4) 97. Matthew 11:19. Luke 7:29, 35. also 1 Timothy 3:16. Similarly God’s servants may be ‘justified’ against the misjudgments and wrongful accusations of the worid (Psalms 37:6; cf. Exodus 23:7. Job 23:3–11 and 42:7–9. Psalms 7:8–10 35:19–24 43:1 97:8–12 etc.; and in the NT, Mt 13. Romans 2:5–7. 1 Peter 2:23; cf. 1 Timothy 3:16. Revelation 11:18). Even the wicked may be, relatively, ‘justified’ by comparison with the more wicked (Jeremiah 3:11. Ezekiel 16:51 f.; cf. Matthew 12:41 f.).

But OT thought on this subject arrived at a moral impasse, a contradiction that seemingly admitted of no escape. In the days of judgment on the nation Israel felt that she was ‘more righteous’ than the heathen oppressors (Habakkuk 1:13) and that, at a certain point, she had ‘received of J"‘s hand double for all her sins’ (Jeremiah 10:24. Isaiah 40:2) and J"‘s covenant pledged Him to her reinstatement(Is 54). In this situation, towards the end of the Exile, the Second Isaiah writes,’ My justifler is at handl . . . my lord J" will help me . . . who is he that counts me wicked?’ (Is ,508’-; cf. Romans 8:31–34). For the people of J" a grand vindication is coming: more than this, ‘J"‘s righteous servant’ — either the ideal Israel collectively, or some single representative in whom its character and sufferings are ideally embodied — is to ‘justify many’ in. ‘bearing their iniquities,’ this vicarious office accounting for the shameful death inflicted on him (Isaiah 53); his meek obedience to J"‘s will in the endurance of humiliation and anguish will redound to the benefit of sinful humanity (cf. 53:11 f. vrith 52:13 f.). While the spiritual Israel is thus represented as perfected through sufferings and made the instrument of J"‘s grace towards mankind, the deepened consciousness of individual sin prompted such expressions as those of Jeremiah 17:9. Psalms 51:5 130:3 143:2 (Romans 3:23). and raised the problem of Job 25.’ How can a man be righteous with God?’ Mic 6:6–8 reveals with perfect clearness the way of justification by merit; Micah 7:1–6 shows how completely it was missed; and Micah 7:18–20 points to the one direction in which hope lay, — the covenant grace of J". ‘The seed of Israel’ is to be ‘justified in J"‘and’ saved with an everlasting salvation’ (Isaiah 45) the actual Israel is radically vicious and stands self-condemned (59:12 ff. Gi"- etc.). Such is the final verdict of prophecy.

Under the legal regime dominating ‘Judaism’ from the age of Ezra onwards, the principle of which was expressed by Paul in Galatians 3:12 (‘He that doeth those things shall live in them’), this problem took another and most acute form. ‘The personal favour of God, and the attainment by Israel of the Messianic salvation for herself and the world, were staked on the exact fulfilment of the Mosaic Law, and circumcision was accepted as the seal, stamped upon the body of every male Jew, of the covenant based on this understanding (see Galatians 5:3). Romans 7:7–25 shows how utterly this theory had failed for the individual, and Romans 9:30 asserts its national failure.

2. St. Paul’s doctrine of Justification is explained negatively by his recoil from the Judaism just described. In the cross of Christ there had been revealed to him, after his abortive struggles, God’s way of justifying men (Romans 7:24 8:4). This was in reahty the old way, trodden by Abraham (Romans 4), ‘witnessed to by the law and the prophets’ — by the Mosaic sacrifices and the Isaianic promises. Paul takes up again the threads that dropped from the hands of the later Isaiah. He sees in ‘Jesus Christ and him crucified’ the mysterious figure of Is S3 — an identification already made by John the Baptist and by the Lord Himself; cf. Romans 5:18–21 with Isaiah 53:11. Upon this view the death of the Messiah on Calvary, which so terribly affronted Saul the Pharisee, is perfectly explained; ‘the scandal of the cross’ is changed to glory (1 Corinthians 1:23–31. Galatians 2:20 f. S’s 6:14. 2 Corinthians 5:21). The ‘sacrifice for sin’ made in the death of Jesus vindicates and reinstates mankind before God. ‘Justification’ is, in Pauline language, synonymous with ‘reconciliation’ (atonement) — see Romans 3:23 ff. 5:11 and ‘5-21, esp. 2 Corinthians 5:19. where God is said to be’ reconciling the world to himself in ‘not imputing to them their trespasses’ ; the same act which is a reconciliation as it concerns the disposition and attitude of the parties affected, is a justification as it concerns their ethical footing, their relations in the order of moral law. The ground of the Christian justification lies in the grace, concurrent with the righteousness, of God the Father, which offers a pardon wholly gratuitous as regards the offender’s deserts (Romans 3:23 f. 4:4 f., 5:6, 8, 21 6:23 etc.. Hebrews 2:9). The means is the vicarious expiatory death of Jesus Christ, ordained by God for this very end (Romans 3:24 f. 4:25 5. 2 Corinthians 5:14, 18; cf. Matthew 20:28 26:28, Hebrews 9 jois, 1 Peter 2:24 3:18. 1 John 1:7 4:10, 14, Revelation 1:5 etc.). The sole condition is faith, with baptism tor its outward sign, repentance being of course implicit in both (Romans 6:3 f.; Galatians 3; Romans 6:2, 21, 1 Corinthians 6:11. Acts 20:21 22:16 26:18 etc.); i.e. the trustful acceptance by the sin-convicted man of God’s grace meeting him in Christ (Romans 4:25 5:1. Galatians 2:20 f. etc.); the clause ‘through faith in Jesus Christ’ of Ro 3:22 is the subjective counterpart (man meeting God) of the objective expression ‘through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (God meeting man) in v. 24..

There underlies this whole doctrine the assumption of the solidarity of mankind with Jesus Christ: He did not interfere from the outside, to mal^e Himself a substitute for man — the ethical objection to Paulinism based on this presumption is irrelevant — but ‘offered himself unblemished to God’ from within humanity, being ‘the one man’ willing and able to perform ‘the one justificatory act,’ to render ‘the obedience’ which availed ‘for all men unto a life-giving justification’ (Romans 5:15, 21). Hence Paul is careful to refer the justification of mankind to the ‘grace of the one man Jesus Christ,’ in whom the race recognizes its highest self, side by side with the ‘grace of God’ conveyed by Him and lodged in Him, the Son of God (Romans 5:15). All great boons are won and achievements realized by individual leaders, ‘captains of salvation’ for their fellows. Moreover, the propitia^ tory ‘offering’ was not the mere negative satisfaction of repentance, a vicarious apology on Christ’s part for the rest of us; it was rendered by His positive ‘obedience unto death, yea the death of the cross,’ by His meek acceptance of the penalties of transgression falling on Him the undeserving, by His voluntary submission to the law that binds death to sin and that ‘numbered’ Him ‘with the transgressors,’ since He had cast in His lot with them (Isaiah 3:12, Luke 22:37; cf. Gal. 4. Romans 8:2–4)) this is what was meant by saying that He ‘became sin — became a curse — for us, that we might become a righteousness of God in him’ (2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:13). Our Representative was ‘delivered up’ to the execution of Calvary ‘because of our trespasses’; He ‘was raised’ from the dead, released from the prison-house, ‘because of our justification’ effected by His sacrifice (Romans 4:25) — or, as the latter clause is often understood, ‘raised to effect our’ individual ‘justification.’ Fundamentally then, justification is the sentence of acquittal passed by God upon the race of mankind in accepting Christ’s expiation made on its behalf, the reinstatement of the world in the Divine grace which embraces ‘all men’ in its scope (Romans 5:18) experimentally, it takes effect in those who hear the good news and believe; by these the universal amnesty is personally enjoyed (Romans 1:17 3:22 5:1, 1 Corinthians 6:11 etc.).

Justification is realized in (a) ‘the forgiveness of sins,’ and (6) ‘adoption’ into the family of God, whereof ‘the Spirit of God’s Son,’ poured into the heart, is the witness and seal (Romans 8:15 f.; 2 Corinthians 1:22, Galatians 4:6, Ephesians 1:13 f.). That personal justification, according to St. Paul’s idea, embraces sonship along with pardon is evident from the comparison of Galatians 3:13 f. and 4 with 2 Corinthians 5:19–21 and Ephesians 1:7: on the one hand ‘adoption’ and ‘the promise of the Spirit,’ on the other hand ‘forgiveness’ or the ‘non-imputation of trespasses,’ are immediately derived from ‘redemption in Christ’s blood’ and the ‘reconciling of the world to God’; they are alike conditioned upon faith in Jesus. The two are the negative and positive parts of man’s restoration to right relationship with God.

St. James’ teaching on Justification in 2 of his Ep., is concerned only with its condition — with the nature of justifying faith. He insists that this is a practical faith such as shows itself alive and genuine by its ‘works,’ and not the theroetical belief in God which a ‘demon’ may have as truly as a saint. On this point Paul and James were in substance agreed (see 1 Thessalonians 1:3, 2 Thessalonians 1:11, Galatians 5:6) the ‘works of faith’ which James demands, and the ‘works of the law’ which Paul rejects, are quite different things. The opposition between the two writers is at the bottom merely verbal, and was probably unconscious on the part of both. G. G. Findlat.

Justus

This surname is given to three people in NT. 1. Joseph Barsabbas (Acts 1:23). 2. Titus or Titius, host of St. Paul at Corinth (Acts 18:7 RV; the MSS vary between these two forms, and some omit the first name altogether), apparently a Roman citizen who was a ‘proselyte of the gate’ (as he would later have been called), and converted to Christianity by the Apostle (Ramsay, St. Paul the Trav. p. 256). 3. A Jew named Jesus or Joshua who was with St. Paul in his first Roman imprisonment (Colossians 4:11). A. J. Maclean.

Jutah

Jutah or JUTTAH (in Joshua 15:55 AV has Juttah, which is read in 21i« by both AV and RV). — A town of Judah (Joshua 15:55) given to the priests as a city of refuge for the manslayer (Joshua 21:16). It has been left out of the catalogue of cities of refuge in 1 Chronicles 6:59, but QPB adds note: ‘Insert, Juttah with her pasture grounds.’ It has been suggested that Jutah was the residence of Zacharias and Elisabeth, and the birthplace of John the Baptist (Luke 1:39 ‘a city of Judah’). Jutah is probably the modern village of Yutla, standing high on a ridge 16 miles from Beit Jibrln (Eleutheropolis).

K

Jhwh

Jhwh (familiar to us in the incorrect form ‘Jehovah ‘; the real vocalization is almost certainly’ Jahweh’ [see God, p. 299’‘]); <,2)Adonai; (3) Elohim. By a misinterpretation of Leviticus 24 the Jews shrank from uttering the first of these, and added to its tour consonants, in their reading of the OT, the vowels of either Adonai or Elohim. When the vowels of the former were added, the AV and RV generally translate the word by’ Lord’; when those of the latter, by ‘God’; using small capitals in each case. If, however, Adonai is originally in the text, they represent it by ‘Lord,’ using an initial capital only. Thus in the OT ‘Lord’ represents Jahweh when it was read as Adonai; and ‘Lord’ represents Adonai when it stands in the original text. This distinctive printing is not observed in the NT. There are several other Hebrew words in the OT expressing the general idea of lordship, which are rendered by ‘lord’ (Genesis 45:8, Joshua 13:3, Ezra 8 etc.).

In the NT ‘Lord’ is used once as tr. of Babboni (Mark 10:51). and five times of despoils (Luke 2:29, Acts 4:24. 2 Peter 2:1, Jude ‘, Revelation 6:10) in all the latter cases the RV has’ master’ in text or margin. Elsewhere it represents kyrios, applying the title (1) to God (Matthew 1:20. Acts 5:19 etc.); (2) to Christ (Luke 6:46, John 20:28 etc.). Indeed, as applied to Christ, it is the highest confession of His Person (1 Corinthians 12:3, Romans 10:9, Revelation 19:16). The form ‘lord’ in NT indicates mere possession of authority (Matthew 18:25, Luke 16:8 etc.). Chasles T. P. Griebson.